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Predicting Failure in the Commercial Banking Industry 
Abstract 
 The ability to predict bank failure has become much more important since the mortgage 
foreclosure crisis began in 2007.  The model proposed in this study uses proxies for the 
regulatory standards embodied in the so-called CAMELS rating system,
1
 as well as several local 
or national economic variables to produce a model that is robust enough to forecast bank failure 
for the entire commercial bank industry in the United States.  This model is able to predict failure 
(survival) accurately for commercial banks during both the Savings and Loan crisis and the 
mortgage foreclosure crisis.  Other important results include the insignificance of several factors 
proposed in the literature, including total assets, real price of energy, currency ratio and the 
interest rate spread.  
Classification codes: G01, G17, G21, G33 
Keywords: bank failure; banking crises; CAMELS ratings 
I.  Introduction 
 Since 2007, the ability to forecast bank failure has become quite relevant.  Early in the 
mortgage foreclosure crisis (and since 1995), there were very few bank failures.  For example, 
from 2003 through 2007, an average of two commercial banks failed each year.  However, the 
last several years have seen more bank failures than in any period since the early 1990’s.  As a 
result of the Savings and Loan crisis (S&L crisis), which occurred from the 1980s to 
                                                            
1 Prior to January 1, 1997, the Federal Reserve used the CAMEL system, which does not include a variable for 
sensitivity to risk (S). CAMEL refers to scores for capital adequacy , quality of assets, management, equity and 
liquidity, respectively. . http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/1996/19961224/ 
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approximately 1994, Congress passed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA).  These tightened restrictions on savings and loan 
institutions and helped the FDIC to avoid failures and costly bailouts.  It was generally believed 
that these laws, especially the latter, had solved the “too big to fail” problem.   
The current state of the economy, including historically low interest rates, and the ability 
of Government Sponsored entities, investment banks and other real estate financial companies to 
continue to employ many of the practices that led to the mortgage foreclosure crisis suggest that 
the relatively high rate of bank failures will continue into the immediate future.  The usefulness 
of a model that can predict failure accurately remains high and is likely to remain so for future 
financial crises, recessions or other periods of relatively large numbers of failures.  
 Over the years, researchers have used a wide variety of methods to predict bank failure.  
Failure prediction models are normally constructed using either internal or external bank data. 
External data include a variety of economic measures that affect a bank’s income and cost and 
asset values, thereby affecting its solvency. Internal data collected by regulators is often broken 
down into six main categories- capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, 
and sensitivity to risk in order to compute CAMELS ratings.  These ratings give a bank a score 
from one to five with one being the highest rank and five being the lowest.  Regulators normally 
review each bank annually since CAMELS ratings have been shown become stale more quickly 
than off-site models using call report data.  (Cole and Gunther 1995). One primary source of 
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internal data for researchers in the United States, and that is heavily relied upon here, is the 
quarterly Report of Condition and Income (Call Report), which is available through the FDIC.
2
 
 This paper demonstrates the effectiveness of binary models in forecasting failure for the 
entire commercial banking industry.  Section II provides a comprehensive review of previous 
techniques used to predict bank failure and a comparison between the various models.  Section 
III details the data and methods used here.  Section IV provides initial results using logit and 
probit models and examines whether a model appropriate for the S & L crisis remains useful for 
the mortgage foreclosure crisis.  Because the selection of a critical value for assessing the failure 
probability can have a relatively large effect on the prediction results, the effect a change in the 
critical value on these results is examined.  Section V demonstrates the ability of the model to 
predict failure in the entire banking industry for crisis periods over the past twenty years. Section 
VI summarizes key findings and provides conclusions. 
II. A Variety of Techniques 
 The most prominent statistical methods used to predict failure of banks are logistic 
regression, neural networks, and multivariate discriminant analysis.  The most popular 
intelligence techniques involving neural networks (NN) include multi-layer perception (MLP), 
back-propagation neural networks (BPNN), and learning vector quantization (LVQ).  More 
recently developed techniques used to determine probability of failure include Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) and trait recognition.  The variety of techniques speaks to the demand for an 
accurate model.  Previous researchers have found prediction accuracy from several of these 
                                                            
2 Both individual and bulk data are available.  Individual quarterly data going back to 2001 are on the FDIC website: 
www.fdic.gov.  Bulk data are available either through the FFIEC Central Data Repository's Public Data Distribution 
web site: https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ and also through the Chicago Federal Reserve in SAS format.  
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models to be roughly similar to that of logistic regression.  A brief summary of these techniques 
is provided below.   
Artificial neural networks are used to model various problems based on multiple layers: 
generally an input layer, a hidden layer, and an output layer.  Use of artificial neural networks is 
popular in a variety of fields including agriculture, business, and manufacturing.  Perhaps the 
most popular technique, multi-layer perceptron (MLP), utilizes a feed-forward method of 
mapping sets of inputs onto outputs in which information never moves backward through the 
model and one or more of the layers are hidden (Boyacioglu, Kara et al. 2009).  Since neural 
networks adapt to given inputs, in order to employ them in the real-world a large variety of data 
must be provided.  This is the primary drawback and one reason why these approaches are not 
used here.  
 Discriminant analysis (DA) is similar to logistic regression in that the dependent 
“discriminant score” variable can be thought of as a function of the inputs.  This technique 
differs from logistic regression because discriminant analysis is modeled using a normal 
distribution.  The primary goal of this technique is to determine in which group a particular 
subject should be placed.  Unlike logistic regression, discriminant analysis can be used to place 
subjects into more than two categories.  This method is broken down into several specific 
categories including linear discriminant analysis (LDA), quadratic discriminant analysis (QDA), 
and multivariate discriminant analysis (Demyanyk and Hasan 2009).   
 Multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) is popular in several areas, including corporate 
finance and marketing.  This technique has several drawbacks.  Aside from the possibly 
inaccurate assumption that the data follows a normal distribution, MDA also requires equal 
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variance-covariance matrices between groups.  However Ohlson (1980) notes that this may not 
be important if MDA is only used for discriminating between groups.   
 One of the most recent modeling techniques is support vector machine (SVM) which has 
often been used for machine learning.  Several researchers have found that it is able to predict 
accurately (Vapnik 1995; Boyacioglu, Kara et al. 2009).  Recently, other techniques have 
emerged for analyzing failure, including case-based reasoning, decision trees, and soft 
computing.  However, these methods have been used infrequently for one reason or another. 
The Cox proportional hazard model (PHM) has been used occasionally to determine the 
likelihood of bank failure over a specific period of time.  Unlike several other hazard models, the 
Cox model is considered a semi-parametric model with both parametric and non-parametric 
inputs.  Research using this model shows that it is able to predict bank failure well in advance 
(Whalen 1991; Shumway 1999; Wheelock and Wilson 2000).   
II.1 Binary Models  
 Logistic regression has long been applied to predict bank failure.  This method uses a 
non-normal distribution in order to determine the probability of an event occurring.  The 
dependent variable, Zi, can be calculated based on the odds ratio Pi/(1-Pi).   
To determine whether an observation will survive or fail, a critical value, c, is used.  In 
failure literature when Pi≥ c, this is defined as a failure.  The critical value is generally set at 0.5 
which equalizes the area for both success and failure.  As Barr and Siems (1999) demonstrate, 
altering this critical value can significantly change the number of Type I and Type II failures.  
They provide their results using different critical values and recommend leaving the critical 
value at 0.5. Ohlson(1980) uses a logit model to analyze corporate bankruptcy and finds that size 
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of a firm and measures of its liquidity, financial structure, and performance are all significant 
factors in determining bankruptcy probability.    
 The probit model is another popular binary model used in the failure literature and the 
principal model used here.  Unlike the logit model, probit analysis assumes a standardized 
normal distribution.  Like the logit model, the probit relies on linear regression: 
 
 Ii = β0 + β1x1 + … + βnxn (1) 
 
where Ii is the unobservable utility index.  The probit model also uses a critical value.  Typically, 
if the probability of failure calculated by the model is greater than 0.5, then the bank is expected 
to fail.  Research into these models has found that their accuracy is similar to that of logit models 
(Hanweck 1977; Barr and Siems 1999).
3
 
 Kolari, Glennon, et. al. (2002) use a sample of 100 large banks and employ both a logit 
model and non-parametric trait recognition.  They divide their data into an in-sample and out-
sample in order to test their ability to predict failure.  While their study finds that trait 
recognition has superior predictive accuracy, the authors note that both models are at least 90% 
accurate when predicting failure.   
 Halling and Hayden (2007) employ a two-step survival model by combining survival 
time analysis and a multi-period logit model.  They use data on 1,250 Austrian banks from 1995-
2002.  Their results indicate that bank age is significant and that their two step model 
outperforms other logit models.  Several further attempts to combine logit and probit models 
                                                            
3 Gerken and Dimmock (2011) use a probit model to predict failure among investment managers. Their model is 
quite successful, but does not predict as well as various bank faiure models. The latter benefit from more readily 
quantifiable performance factors and also may be subject to somewhat more discretion in determining fraud.  
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with other techniques, such as discriminant analysis, in order to increase accuracy have also been 
successful (Canbas, Canbas et al. 2005).   
 Barr and Siems (1999) use proxies for the CAMELS ratings with data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) efficiency as the proxy for the management quality variable in order to predict 
failure.  They use 445 surviving and 294 failed banks during the S & L crisis.  In order to keep 
control for the wide variance between small, medium, and large banks and also de novo and 
older banks, the authors use only banks that are at least ten years old and had between $20 
million and $200 million in total assets.  Barr and Siems find that their model out-performs many 
previous logistic models.  First, prediction accuracy in their one year and two year models are 
92.4% and 94.8% respectively.  Their results are better than those of Hanweck, whose prediction 
accuracy was found to be 80.8% and 91.1% respectively.  This improvement in accuracy is 
worth a second look to determine if the model can be applied as well to a broader array of 
commercial banks and in other time periods.   
  Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a method of examining production efficiency.  This 
is done by transforming a given number of inputs into a given number of outputs.  DEA is a non-
parametric approach which makes it less complex than other productivity methods such as 
stochastic frontier analysis.  It is important to note that there is no equation for the relationship 
between the inputs and the outputs.  DEA has been used in several studies to evaluate bank 
failure (Barr, Seiford et al. 1993; Barr and Siems 1999; Kao and Liu 2004).  Barr and Siems 
(1996) make use of the CAMELS variables and include one variable indicating local economic 
conditions.  They find that failed banks exhibit significantly less efficiency given one year and 
two years of quarterly data predicting failure.  Kao and Liu (2004) make use of DEA to predict 
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the performances of two dozen banks in Taiwan.  They also find that this method is able to 
accurately predict bank failure. 
II.2 A Comparison of Prediction Models  
There have been several attempts to find the most accurate model for bank failure.  
Boyacioglu et. al. (2009) use a data set of 21 failed banks and 44 non-failed banks to test the 
ability of MLP, CLNN, self-organizing map (SOM), LVQ, MDA, and several other models to 
predict failure.  They use 43 of these banks as a training set and forecast failure likelihood for the 
remaining 22 banks.  Data were collected from 1996-2003, when Turkey faced a rise in bank 
failures.  Twenty financial ratios were collected, with many of the ratios fulfilling the role of the 
CAMELS variables.  The researchers find that while MLP is the most accurate, several other 
neural networks perform well.  Logistic regression performs adequately.   
Lee, Booth, and Alam (2005) use four sets of banks to compare the accuracy of BPNN, 
SOM, logistic regression, and descriptive analysis when predicting bankruptcy of Korean firms.  
They use models with two year and three year data and determine that BPNN outperforms the 
other models.  The logistic model in their study is able to predict bankruptcy about 65% of the 
time  (Lee, Booth et al. 2005).  Min and Lee (2005) examine firm bankruptcy and find that SVM 
out-performs MDA, BPNN, and a logit model(Min and Lee 2005). De Ceca and Mora (2005) 
examine 30 varieties of winter barley crops in Spain in order to determine whether varieties 
could be placed into three categories: accept, reject, and test (unsure).  They determine that LVQ 
outperforms QDA when classifying seeds into categories. 
 Wu et. al. (2007) examine a new model, referred to as the genetic-based SVM (GA-
SVM) model. They use a sample of 88 firms, including 22 failed firms.  Their results indicate 
that the GA-SVM predicts failure of firms better than the BPNN, DA, SVM, logit, and probit 
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models.  The real-valued genetic algorithm used in this paper is the first of its kind to predict 
bankruptcy(Wu, Tzeng et al. 2007). Nonetheless, in this study the most prominent approach, 
logistic probit and logit models, are employed.   
III. Data 
 Many researchers have developed successful proxies for the CAMELS variables over the 
last two decades.  In several of these, the model accuracy is above 90% on average (Barr and 
Siems 1999; Kolari, Glennon, et. al., 2002).  However, the majority of these studies have focused 
upon finding model accuracy for a very small and restricted sample of the overall commercial 
banking industry.  This study uses a much larger sample than previous work.  Incorporating the 
most significant elements from previous research should provide a starting point for the 
development of such an appropriate model. 
 Data were collected from individual quarterly commercial bank call reports
4
 and 
government data from 1988-1994 and 2006-2010 when bank failures were most common in 
order to assess the ability of the model.  Table 1 provides the variables used.  
The final column in Table 1 (RSSDID) identifies the bank-specific measure used to 
calculate each variable.  The FDIC assigns RSSD ID’s which correspond to individual items on 
the financial statements of commercial banks.   
The model combines several of the most significant variables from previous studies.  The 
most popular proxy for capturing capital adequacy in previous literature is total equity divided by 
either total assets or total loans.  To remain consistent with Barr and Siems (1999), total loans is 
used here (C01).  As banks trend toward failure, their equity position is likely to decrease, thus a 
negative relationship is expected between C01 and failure.   
                                                            
4 Call report data was downloaded from the Chicago Fed using the website: 
http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/banking/financial_institution_reports/commercial_bank_data.cfm 
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Table 1: Description of Variables 
Variable Description RSSDID 
Capital adequacy Total Equity Capital/ Total Loans & Leases  RCFD3210/RCFD1400 
Asset Quality Total Loans Not Accruing + Loans 90+ Days Late/Total Assets  (RCFD1403+RCFD1407)/RCFD2170 
Management Quality See Below   
Earnings Net Income / Total Assets  RCFD4340/RCFD2170 
Liquidity Total Loans & Leases, Gross/ Total Deposits  RCFD1400/RCFD2200 
SPREADLAG 
 1-qtr lagged spread between 10 yr. Treasury notes and 3-mo. Treasury 
bills 
  
RPELAG  1-qtr lagged change in the natural log of real price of energy   
FOREC_INV 
Percentage of total mortgages in establishment state in foreclosure 
inventory 
  
AGE   Current year- Date of Establishment   
TA  Ln(TA) Ln(RCFD2170)  
DEA Inputs     
Input 1  Cash RCFD0010 
Input 2 Salaries and Benefits RCFD4135 
Input 3  Other real estate owned + Premises and Fixed Assets RCFD2150 + RCFD2145 
Input 4 Other noninterest expense RCFD4092 
Input 5 
Deposits + Fed Funds Purchased + Mortgage obligations +  Bank 
Liabilities on Acceptances + Subordinated Debt + Other Borrowed Money 
RCFD6636+RCFD2800+(RCFD2950-RCFD2200-
RCFD2800-RCFD2930)+RCFD3200+RCFD2850 
DEA Outputs     
Output 1 Total loans and leases, net of unearned income RCFD2122 
Output 2 
Securities Held to Maturity + Securities available for sale + Federal funds 
Sold and securities purchased + Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries 
and associated companies 
RCFD0390+RCFD2146+RCFD1350+RCFD2130 
Output 3 Deposits—noninterest bearing RCFD6631 
 
The asset quality variable used is loans not accruing plus loans over 90 days late/ total assets.  
This ratio (A) increases as banks holds more uncollectible debt on their books, so a positive 
relation is expected.  DEA efficiency is used here to capture the quality of management (M).
5
  
Like Barr and Siems (1996), this model uses proxies for the CAMELS ratings, with DEA 
efficiency as a proxy for the management variable.  Since better management is associated with 
an improvement in efficiency, the management variable (M) is expected to be negatively related 
                                                            
 
5 DEA efficiency is calculated using FEAR software written by Dr. Paul Wilson for use in the R statistical program.  
Free downloads of this software are available on Dr. Wilson’s website at: 
http://www.clemson.edu/economics/faculty/wilson/Software/FEAR/agree-to-license.html (Accessed on 
6/17/2011) 
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to failure. The model developed by Haslem et al ( 1999) is used to construct the DEA efficiency 
measure. 
For earnings, the most popular ratio in the literature (net income/total assets) is used (E) 
and is expected to have a negative influence on the probability of failure.  Finally, the ratio total 
loans/total deposits is used as a proxy for bank liquidity (L).  As banks lend more, they become 
less liquid and less able to quickly repay their current liabilities.  Liquidity has been shown to be 
a serious cause of concern for failed banks.  Therefore, a negative relationship is expected 
between liquidity and failure.
6
 
In order to capture adverse economic conditions, several economic variables were 
examined.  The first is the lagged spread between the 10-Year Treasury yield and the 3-Month 
Treasury yield, both measured on a constant maturity basis, (SPREADLAG).  A larger spread 
indicates that investors have positive expectations concerning the economy, which should 
improve future earnings, but the spread also indicates capital losses may not have been fully 
reflected in the CAMELS measure. Therefore the spread should have a positive effect on the 
.probability of failure.  The second factor (RPELAG) is the change in the natural log of the real 
price of energy (lagged one quarter).  This is added in order to account for energy price changes 
over the period of the study.  Large increases in energy prices reduce economic activity and 
market income, raising loan defaults, lowering bank income and promoting the rush to failure. A 
third measure, the natural log of the currency ratio, the ratio of currency held by the public to 
checkable deposits and sweeps, balances, lagged one quarter, indicates the level of uncertainty 
and lack of confidence in banks, as well as a broader measure of a lack of liquidity in the 
economy, according to some monetary economists. During crisis periods, people tend to hold 
                                                            
6 Bologna (2011) finds that liquidity measures are significant in predicting bank failures in 2008-09, one of the first 
studies to examine the recent experience, ex post.  
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more cash relative to bank deposits, straining bank liquidity, increasing fire sales of assets and 
raising the probability of failure. Another potential influence on the probability of failure is the 
percentage of mortgages within a bank’s incorporation state that are in the foreclosure inventory 
(FOREC_INV).  Larger numbers of foreclosures are expected to result in lost income, deplete 
capital, and increase the failure rate.  The final two variables are the age of each institution 
(AGE, in years), and the natural log of total assets (TA).  Because of the wide range of assets, it 
was important to identify an effect that size or age might have on an institution’s likelihood of 
failure.   
 Previous research has often focused only on specific segments of commercial institutions 
such as non-de novo banks or banks with certain amounts of total assets.  For instance, Barr and 
Siems (1999) use only commercial banks that are non-de novo and have total assets between $20 
million and $200 million.  The goal here is a model that can be applied to the entire commercial 
banking industry, without restrictions.  To achieve this goal, both the in-sample data and out-
sample data were drawn from the commercial banking sector as a whole.  In order to eliminate as 
much bias as possible, several rules were followed when selecting banks for this study.  First, all 
institutions in the initial in-sample are domestic institutions.
7
  The ratio of randomly selected 
surviving banks to failed banks in each quarter was set at 2:1 to provide wide representation of 
surviving banks. When selecting surviving institutions, first, failed institutions were broken into 
three total asset sizes: less than $100 million, between $100 million and $1 billion, and greater 
than $1 billion; twice as many surviving banks were selected from each group using a random 
number generator.  In the end, an in-sample of 1470 banks was obtained, with 963 observations 
coming from the S & L Crisis period (1990Q1-1993Q4) and 507 observations from the recent 
crisis period (2008Q3-2009Q4). There are no existing studies of bank failure forecasts or 
                                                            
7 Institutions in which foreign assets accounted for 100% of total assets were eliminated.  
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determinants during the foreclosure crisis period. The original forecast sample includes banks’ 
observations during all four quarters of 2010.  During that period, there is information on 92 
failures and 184 random surviving institutions.  
 Two years of quarterly data were collected for each institution prior to failure (survival) 
in order to examine the relative performance of the model using one quarter, one year, and two 
years of information prior to failure (survival) of institutions.  When using the one-year and two-
year based prediction models, quarterly data for each variable were averaged to provide a single 
measure for each institution.   
IV. Results 
IV.1. Initial Sample 
 The initial in-sample dataset includes 1470 institutions (for both the S & L and mortgage 
foreclosure crises), one third of which failed.  Both a probit and logit model are used to analyze 
the initial data.  It was found that the capital adequacy, asset quality, and earnings variables are 
by far the most significant predictors of failure in the model.   
Table 2: Probit Model 
  2 Year Model 1 Year Model 1 Quarter Model 
Variable Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
C -1.9464 0.0000 ** -1.1940 0.0065 ** -0.6170 0.0903   
C01 -6.4304 0.0000 ** -8.3303 0.0000 ** -11.1219 0.0000 ** 
A 19.1623 0.0000 ** 15.6855 0.0000 ** 14.9228 0.0000 ** 
M 1.9202 0.0000 ** 1.8740 0.0000 ** 0.8342 0.0215 * 
E -114.5240 0.0000 ** -89.0657 0.0000 ** -36.2035 0.0000 ** 
L -0.2445 0.1725   -1.4141 0.0000 ** -0.9921 0.0000 ** 
SPREADLAG 0.0659 0.4239   0.1620 0.0072 ** 0.2277 0.0000 ** 
McFadden R-squared 0.7139     0.7601     0.7468     
  * Significant at the 0.05 level 
  ** Significant at the 0.01 level 
Table 2 gives the coefficients and significance of the variables used in the probit 
regressions.  The RPELAG, currency ratio and TA variables are generally not found to be 
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significant in this study and with the exception of SPREADLAG in Tables 2 and 3 are dropped 
(results are available upon request).  Their omission has no detectable influence on the reported 
results.  The foreclosure inventory variable and age are also not found to be significant in this 
sample and also are dropped.   
All of the significant variables have the expected sign with the exception of the 
efficiency/management measure, which is significant but has the “wrong” sign with both the 
two-year and one-year information sets. Previous research, such as Barr and Siems (1999), has 
found a significant negative relation between efficiency and failure in both the two and one year 
models.  However, their study confined banks to a minimum and maximum total asset level and 
was for a period just before the worst of the S&L crisis. The data here indicate that as the failure 
date approaches, banks become less efficient.  The mean efficiency measure for the failed banks 
is below that for the surviving banks, for example. To find out what causes this effect, the 
correlations between the CAMEL variables are examined. 
Table 3: CAMEL Correlations in the 2 Year Probit Model 
  C01 A M E L 
C01 1.0000 -0.0135 0.0216 0.0372 -0.0003 
A 
 
1.0000 -0.0119 -0.4349 0.0068 
M 
  
1.0000 0.0742 0.0619 
E 
   
1.0000 0.0148 
L 
    
1.0000 
 
Table 3 shows the correlations between the CAMEL variables in the two-year in-sample 
information set.  The correlations between management quality and earnings, asset quality and 
earnings, and management quality and liquidity are relatively high and statistically significant at 
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the five percent level. Excluding the earnings variable from the model changes the sign of the 
efficiency variable to the expected relationship to failure, but the fit of the estimate deteriorates. 
The correlation between management quality and earnings in the one year and one quarter 
models are similarly large, 0.1264 and 0.0868, respectively.  To anticipate later results, 
increasing the sample size actually does result in a negative relationship between management 
quality and failure (see section V). To identify how well the model fits the data, the McFadden 
pseudo-R
2
 measure is used. All three estimates exhibit Pseudo-R
2
 values between 0.7139 and 
0.7468.    
 
 Figure 1 shows a scatterplot of the probability of failure for each bank included during 
the quarter in which they eventually failed (survived).  The probability of failure is between zero 
and one and banks numbered 1 through 980 on the horizontal axis survived while banks 
0.0
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0.8
1.0
250 500 750 1000 1250
PROBABILITY OF FAILURE
Figure 1: In-sample Probability of Failure
Two Year Probit Model
Individual Bank ID
Probability
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numbered 981 through 1470 failed.  There is a clear visual distinction between the two groups of 
banks.   
Table 4: Logit Model 
  2 Year Model 1 Year Model 1 Quarter Model 
Variable Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
C -3.1919 0.0003 ** -1.1459 0.1951   0.6990 0.3831   
C01 -14.7636 0.0000 ** -18.9428 0.0000 ** -28.8225 0.0000 ** 
A 30.8250 0.0000 ** 25.2097 0.0000 ** 25.5293 0.0000 ** 
M 3.4609 0.0001 ** 3.2388 0.0002 ** 0.9146 0.2209   
E -216.1389 0.0000 ** -168.5839 0.0000 ** -57.6631 0.0000 ** 
L -0.3231 0.4484   -3.2072 0.0000 ** -3.0406 0.0000 ** 
SPREADLAG 0.1514 0.3534   0.3262 0.0076   0.5802 0.0000 ** 
McFadden R-squared 0.7201     0.7673     0.7740     
* Significant at the 0.05 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
The logit model estimates in Table 4 use the same variables as the probit model in Table 
2.  The results are similar to those in Table 2.  The signs of the significant variables are the same 
as in Table 2.  It is important to note the larger pool of data in this study compared with that of 
Barr and Siems (1999) and others.  Because of fewer restrictions on the sample data, one might 
expect accuracy to be lower, but the sample size is much larger than in previous studies, which 
presumably compensates with improved accuracy.  It is not possible to infer whether this model 
would be more accurate than previous studies. 
Table 5: Percentage of Correct In-Sample Predictions in Probit Model 
  Barr and Siems Current Model 
  Survivals Failures Combined Survivals  Failures Combined 
Two Year 92.1% 82.9% 88.9% 97.55% 86.12% 93.74% 
One Year 94.4% 89.5% 92.4% 97.96% 86.73% 94.22% 
One Quarter - - - 98.16% 87.35% 94.56% 
 
Table 5 shows the comparison of in-sample accuracy between the Barr and Siems (1999) 
probit model and the probit model in Table 2 for two years, one year, and one quarter of 
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information. The Barr and Siems (1999) study does not include estimates for a one-quarter 
window of information.  They examine commercial bank failures (survivors) from 1986-1988.  
In Barr and Siems (1999) and the current model here, accuracy is quite high, though the current 
model performs slightly better overall.  In both cases, overall accuracy of the one-year 
information variables is better than using the two-year window of information.  However, the 
estimate based on one-quarter data here has slightly better accuracy than that based on one-year 
information. The superior performance here is all the more impressive given the inclusion of a 
broader set of banks and the higher failure rates and longer sample here.  
IV.2. Are the S&L and Foreclosure Crises Failure Models Different? 
 Figure 2 below shows the annual number of failures for the latest 12 month period from 
1935 through March 2011. In terms of the number of failures, the S & L Crisis and the mortgage 
foreclosure crisis were similar.  From January 1, 1984 to December 31, 1994 a total of 131 
commercial banks failed annually compared with 122 annually from 2008Q3 to 2010Q3.  It 
appears that regulations such as FIRREA and FDICIA have not been as successful as previously 
thought, although this could be due to the deregulation of the banking industry during the mid 
and late 1990’s or to differences in the types or extent of shocks. 
It should be emphasized, however, that 2,655 banks failed from 1984 through 1994, 
while only 306 failed in the nearly three years of the mortgage foreclosure crisis covered here. 
The annual pace of failure has declined from a peak of 182 in the twelve months ending in May, 
2010 to 119 in the twelve months ending in June 2011.  
Other differences between the S & L Crisis and the mortgage foreclosure crisis include 
the proportion of commercial bank to savings bank failures and the presence of “zombie” banks.  
Between 1984 and 1994, 1448 commercial banks and 1207 savings institutions failed.  During 
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the first two years of the mortgage foreclosure crisis, 250 commercial banks and 51 thrifts failed.  
The difference in the proportion of commercial banks to savings banks illustrates that the two 
crises might affected banks differently.  During the S & L crisis, the presence of zombie banks 
and S&Ls (institutions whose net worth is less than zero but who continued to operate) helped 
drive up CD rates and drive down loan rates.  These institutions were willing to take greater risks 
in order to remain solvent which led to increased cost pressures for other banks and at least 
partially contributed to the failure of other, more solvent banks. 
 
Figure 2 
Bank Failures Show Two Surges since the 1930s 
 
 
Source: FDIC 
 Several changes have taken place since the S & L crisis including the rapid merging of 
banks, which accounts for the larger size of banks on average today, though size does not appear 
to affect the probability of failure here. Certainly among the top 10 banks or so, recent 
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experience indicates that too-big-to-fail remains in force.  Some might argue that the recent 
period of failures is fundamentally different from the previous high failure period because it was 
associated with the foreclosure and financial crises and the Great Recession.  However, both 
periods were associated with excessive real estate loan problems. The key difference may simply 
be that there were far fewer thrift institutions after 1994, even relative to the decline in the 
number of banks.  
IV.3. Forecasting 
To test the flexibility and forecasting ability of the model in more detail, the estimate in 
Table 2 is used to forecast failures during an out-of-sample period, the four quarters of 2010.  
The critical value for failure probability (c) is set equal to 0.50, following previous research. If 
the probability of failure calculated from the probit model was greater than this value, it is 
classified as a failure.  Raising the critical value for the criterion for failure raises type II error for 
failure, but reduces the extent of type I error, incorrectly identifying a failing bank as a survivor.  
A policy maker or regulator is interested in a highly accurate forecast of failure, but also, if not 
more so, in minimizing type I error. The results indicate that the model is able to accurately 
predict bank failure for randomly selected surviving banks and all actual failing banks. As 
expected (not shown), the results from both the logit and probit models are quite similar with 
negligible differences in prediction ability.  The coefficients in Table 2 are used to forecast 
survival and failure in Table 6.   
It should be noted that the current model is able to predict failure accuracy even given 
only one-quarter data (panel 6c).  Accuracy is generally better in the out-of-sample period than 
in-sample, except for survivors with two-year and one-year data. The combined and failure 
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forecasts outperform the in-sample forecasts and both exceed 95 percent with all three 
information sets.   
Table 6 
Model Accuracy In-Sample and 2010 Out-of-Sample Forecasts 
Using Various Information Windows for Data 
 
Panel 6a: 2-Year Probit Model 
  In-sample   Out-sample 
  Survive Fail Combined Survive Fail Combined 
% Correct 97.55% 86.12% 93.74% 93.48% 98.91% 95.29% 
% Incorrect 2.45% 13.88% 6.26% 6.52% 1.09% 4.71% 
       
Panel 6b: 1-Year Probit Model 
  In-sample   Out-sample 
  Survive Fail Combined Survive Fail Combined 
% Correct 97.96% 86.73% 94.22% 92.93% 98.91% 94.93% 
% Incorrect 2.04% 13.27% 5.78% 7.07% 1.09% 5.07% 
       
Panel 6c: 1-Quarter Probit Model 
  In-sample   Out-sample 
  Survive Fail Combined Survive Fail Combined 
% Correct 98.16% 87.35% 94.56% 95.65% 96.74% 96.01% 
% Incorrect 1.84% 12.65% 5.44% 4.35% 3.26% 3.99% 
 
IV.4. Forecasting Failure in a Larger Sample 
 A second experiment (Table 7) uses data on all commercial banks for an out-of-sample 
forecast for the first three quarters of 2010.  In the first quarter of 2010, there are complete data 
for 7186 individual commercial banks, 37 of which failed.  In the second quarter, there are 
complete data for 7112 banks, 40 of which failed.  In the third quarter, there is complete 
information for 7014 commercial banks, 32 of which failed.   Thus, there are 21312 observations 
in the out-of-sample period, the first three quarters of 2010.  
 The model is able to accurately forecast failure with all three information sets. The 
estimate that uses only one-quarter data is able to predict failure accurately for 96.33% of failed 
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banks, the best combined accuracy. All three estimates have an overall out-of-sample forecasting 
accuracy of at least 92% for the all bank out-of-sample forecasts. This is significant because it 
indicates that the proxies for the CAMELS variables can be successfully applied to the entire 
commercial banking industry.   
Table 7a: 2-Year Probit Model with All Commercial Banks out-sample 
  In-sample Out-sample 
  Survive Fail Total Survive Fail Total 
% Correct 97.55% 86.12% 93.74% 94.15% 98.17% 94.17% 
% Incorrect 2.45% 13.88% 6.26% 5.85% 1.83% 5.83% 
# of Obs. 980 490 1470 21203 109 21312 
       
Figure 7b: 1-Year Probit Model with All Commercial Banks out-sample 
  In-sample Out-sample 
  Survive Fail Total Survive Fail Total 
% Correct 97.96% 86.73% 94.22% 92.13% 99.08% 92.16% 
% Incorrect 2.04% 13.27% 5.78% 7.87% 0.92% 7.84% 
# of Obs. 980 490 1470 21203 109 21312 
       
Figure 7c: 1-Quarter Probit Model with All Commercial Banks out-
sample 
  In-sample Out-sample 
  Survive Fail Total Survive Fail Total 
% Correct 98.16% 87.35% 94.56% 95.61% 96.33% 95.62% 
% Incorrect 1.84% 12.65% 5.44% 4.39% 3.67% 4.38% 
# of Obs. 980 490 1470 21203 109 21312 
 
Both probit and logit models produce similar forecasting results.  However, because of the large 
number of surviving institutions, even a small decrease in prediction accuracy for survival could 
lead to a large number of banks being incorrectly predicted to survive.   
One change that could dramatically affect the forecasting accuracy of binary models is 
the selection of a critical value for failure.  According to Barr and Siems, a change in the critical 
value used in the model could significantly alter the number of Type I and Type II prediction 
errors.  Table 8 demonstrates how a change in the critical value alters the predictive accuracy 
during the forecasting period.  Increasing the critical value for the probability of failure makes it 
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more likely that some predicted values will be classified as a survivor, and vice versa.  Since the 
number of surviving institutions vastly outweighs the number of failed institutions, it may be 
appropriate to increase the critical value in order to increase the total predictive accuracy of the 
model.   
Overall predictive accuracy does not decrease even when the critical value is set to 0.8.  
However, the one quarter model’s ability to predict failure accurately does fall below 91% when 
the critical value is raised to 0.8.  It appears that there are several ideal critical values that could 
be used depending on the researcher’s objectives.   
Table 8: Forecasting Accuracy when Altering the Critical Value 
Critical 
Value 
  2-year Model 1-Year Model 1-Qtr Model 
  Survivals Failures Combined Survivals Failures Combined Survivals Failures Combined 
0.5 
% Correct 94.15% 98.17% 94.17% 92.13% 99.08% 92.16% 95.61% 96.33% 95.62% 
% Incorrect 5.85% 1.83% 5.83% 7.87% 0.92% 7.84% 4.39% 3.67% 4.38% 
0.6 
% Correct 95.12% 97.25% 95.13% 93.18% 98.17% 93.20% 95.61% 96.33% 95.62% 
% Incorrect 4.88% 2.75% 4.87% 6.82% 1.83% 6.80% 4.39% 3.67% 4.38% 
0.7 
% Correct 96.00% 94.50% 95.99% 94.12% 98.17% 94.14% 96.41% 96.33% 96.41% 
% Incorrect 4.00% 5.50% 4.01% 5.88% 1.83% 5.86% 3.59% 3.67% 3.59% 
0.8 
% Correct 96.86% 88.99% 96.82% 95.04% 98.17% 95.05% 97.26% 90.83% 97.23% 
% Incorrect 3.14% 11.01% 3.18% 4.96% 1.83% 4.95% 2.74% 9.17% 2.77% 
 
V. Estimates and Forecasts for the Entire Commercial Banking Industry 
 In the previous section the management quality measure has an unexpected positive 
effect on commercial bank failure.  In addition, several of the other variables examined there are 
not significant at conventional levels.  Because previous researchers have found some of these 
variables to be significant, the dataset was expanded to include all commercial banks that 
provide complete information in the call reports.  When including all available commercial 
banks, the continuing, though reduced, accuracy of the model still stands out and indicates its 
usefulness.   
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The call reports offered by the FDIC are again used.  This time, all commercial banks 
with complete data given by the FDIC in the bulk call reports are used.  In-sample data for banks 
during the periods 1990Q1-1993Q4 and 2008Q3-2009Q4 are used.  Survivals and failures in the 
first three quarters of 2010 are forecast, as in the out-of-sample period used in section IV.4.  The 
in-sample data contain 234,109 quarterly records, 552 of which failed during the period, which 
amounts to a 0.236% rate of failure.  Using a probit model, the included variables are restricted 
to those that are significant with at least two of the information sets.    
Above, it is found that CAMEL measures were the most significant variables, while 
several variables including age of the institution, foreclosure inventory, total assets, the currency 
ratio, and the lagged real price of energy were found to be insignificant with at least two of the 
three information sets. Among non-CAMEL variables, only the interest rate spread was 
significant in the smaller sample. Now, in the all bank sample, it is not, but AGE and the 
foreclosure inventory usually are.    
All variables in this reduced model are significant at well beyond the 1% level.  All 
variables also have the expected effect on failure.  Due to the larger sample size, FOREC_INV 
and AGE, which in the original smaller sample were found to be insignificant at conventional 
levels, now have the expected relationship with failure and usually are significant at the 0.01 
level.   
Table 9: Reduced Probit Model Using CAMELS Variables for All Banks 
Variable 
2 Yr Model 
 
1 Yr Model 
 
1 Qtr Model 
Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob. 
C -1.8841 0.0000 
 
-2.0504 0.0000 
 
-1.8714 0.0000 
C01 -6.6871 0.0000 
 
-6.7083 0.0000 
 
-7.8080 0.0000 
A 14.7397 0.0000 
 
12.5458 0.0000 
 
8.6469 0.0000 
M -0.6812 0.0000 
 
-0.4114 0.0000 
 
-0.5981 0.0000 
E -13.3198 0.0000 
 
-7.8796 0.0000 
 
-5.0945 0.0000 
L 4.58E-05 0.0000 
 
3.77E-05 0.0000 
 
4.04E-05 0.0000 
FOREC_INV 0.0599 0.0005 
 
0.0335 0.0072 
 
0.0288 0.1439 
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AGE -0.0035 0.0000 
 
-0.0033 0.0000 
 
-0.0026 0.0000 
McFadden R-squared 0.3609     0.3976     0.4612   
 
This means that banks operating in states with more foreclosure inventory are more likely to fail.  
The AGE of institution, which was only significant at the 0.05 level in the original one quarter 
model, now has a significant negative effect on bank failure with all three information sets. Older 
institutions are less likely to fail. The pseudo-R
2
 measure for all three models is between 0.36 
and 0.47, with the one quarter model having the highest R
2
.  
 While the R
2
 for the full industry is lower than in the estimates presented in Tables 2 and 
3, this appears to be due to more variability in the data, with several extreme outliers skewing the 
estimates. The commercial banking industry is extremely diverse.  Numerous institutions 
currently operate both as commercial banks and investment banks or insurance companies.  
Because of this diversity and the number of surviving institutions relative to failed ones, 
probabilities of failure in the model become extremely skewed to the left.   
Table 10 shows the out-of-sample prediction accuracy of the CAMEL variables with 
foreclosure inventory and age during the first three quarters of 2010. The out-of-sample forecast 
data includes 21,312 observations over the first three quarters of 2010 including 109 bank 
failures.  This gives a 0.51% failure rate during the forecast period.  The table also shows the 
results for a variety of values of the critical probability value used to classify bank failure. 
At the standard value of 0.5, the probit model is unable to predict a high share of failures, 
but at this value the best combined accuracy of estimates is achieved, and for all three 
information sets. This is because of the extremely high accuracy of the survivor forecast 
resulting in very few failures that were erroneously forecast to be survivors.    
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Table 10: Out-of-Sample Forecasts For the All Bank Model With Various Failure Criteria 
Critical 
Value 
  2-year Model   1-Year Model   1-Qtr Model   
  Survivals Failures Combined Survivals Failures Combined Survivals Failures Combined 
0.5 
% Correct 99.97% 8.26% 99.50% 99.81% 24.77% 99.43% 99.95% 16.51% 99.53% 
% Incorrect 0.03% 91.74% 0.50% 0.19% 75.23% 0.57% 0.05% 83.49% 0.47% 
0.2 
% Correct 99.54% 33.03% 99.20% 99.14% 61.47% 98.95% 99.66% 45.87% 99.39% 
% Incorrect 0.46% 66.97% 0.80% 0.86% 38.53% 1.05% 0.34% 54.13% 0.61% 
0.1 
% Correct 98.78% 55.96% 98.56% 98.27% 82.57% 98.19% 99.16% 74.31% 99.03% 
% Incorrect 1.22% 44.04% 1.44% 1.73% 17.43% 1.81% 0.84% 25.69% 0.97% 
0.05 
% Correct 97.39% 82.57% 97.31% 96.97% 88.07% 96.92% 98.28% 88.99% 98.24% 
% Incorrect 2.61% 17.43% 2.69% 3.03% 11.93% 3.08% 1.72% 11.01% 1.76% 
0.025 
% Correct 95.03% 90.83% 95.01% 95.19% 97.25% 95.20% 96.94% 97.25% 96.94% 
% Incorrect 4.97% 9.17% 4.99% 4.81% 2.75% 4.80% 3.06% 2.75% 3.06% 
0.01 
% Correct 90.03% 96.33% 90.07% 91.15% 98.17% 91.19% 94.01% 99.08% 94.04% 
% Incorrect 9.97% 3.67% 9.93% 8.85% 1.83% 8.81% 5.99% 0.92% 5.96% 
0.005 
% Correct 83.40% 97.25% 83.47% 86.05% 99.08% 86.11% 90.53% 99.08% 90.07% 
% Incorrect 16.60% 2.75% 16.53% 13.95% 0.92% 13.89% 9.47% 0.92% 9.93% 
 
Accuracy is more balanced around a critical value of 0.025, where all three information sets 
yield exceptional accuracy of better than 95 percent for combined accuracy and, with the 
exception of the failure forecast with two-year information, for both survivors and failures. 
If one gives equal weight to minimizing erroneous forecasts of survival in catching 
failures, the combined out-of-sample forecast is exceptionally good and the 0.5 setting for the 
critical value is best. If one can adjust the critical value, it appears that this model for only failure 
forecast accuracy still performs well for the entire industry.  All three information sets produce 
similar prediction results between the in-sample and forecasting sample, but the one-quarter 
information set has the best in-sample fit and the combined accuracy for the out-of-sample 
forecast is also the best for the one-quarter information set.  A decrease in the critical value is 
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shown to increase the incidence of Type I error among survivors, with the benefit of smaller 
forecast errors for failures. However, the trade-off is not favorable to overall forecast accuracy. 
The 0.5 critical value is exceptionally accurate for survivors (99.8 percent to 99.97 percent) and 
for the combined accuracy.  If one desires highly accurate forecasts for the failures only, setting 
the critical value at 0.025, five times the actual probability of failure in the period, produces 
balanced and accurate results, including over 90 percent forecast accuracy for failure forecasts 
only.   
VI. Conclusions 
In this study, proxies for bank-specific CAMELS variables are combined in a model with 
data on economic conditions.  The goal of the paper is to test the overall accuracy and robustness 
of the model for the commercial banking industry of the United States.  This model, which is 
similar to that of Barr and Siems (1999) and incorporates the use of the DEA model proposed by 
Haslem (1999), is found to accurately fit and forecast failure using both probit and logit models 
with two years, one year, or one quarter of data for measures of the independent variables.  The 
results presented here support those of Barr and Siems (1999).  DEA efficiency, used as a proxy 
for management in the CAMEL approach, is found to have a significant negative relationship 
with failure in the larger commercial banking industry sample. While it has the “wrong” sign in 
the smaller sample of about 1500 banks, it contributes significantly to the in-sample fit and 
forecast accuracy of the model.  All CAMEL variables, and age and foreclosure inventory, are 
significant in the larger sample and have the expected relationship with failure.  Older banks and 
banks in states with relatively lower foreclosure inventory are also found to be less likely to fail 
in the all bank sample. Other economic variables, such as the real price of energy, total assets, 
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the interest rate spread and currency ratio are not found to be significant in at least two of the 
models with the larger sample.   
The model developed in this study has strong forecasting accuracy in both the in-sample 
and out-of-sample forecasts.  More importantly, the out-of-sample forecasts for the first three 
quarters of 2010 using data for all U.S. available commercial banks (or for the smaller sample) 
outperform the in-sample estimates. The criteria used here follows the usual practice of using a 
Bayesian prior of a 50 percent probability of failure. Experiments with the original sample show 
that this can be improved upon by moving the probability up to 70 percent, and for the out-of-
sample forecasts using all bank data, it is suggested that Type 1 and Type II errors can be 
minimized by independent variation of the probability of failure toward 80 percent to minimize 
type II error, though the 50 percent criterion works extremely well for minimizing errors in 
failure forecasts.  
When all available data on commercial banks are used (Section V) the high number of 
surviving banks relative to failures affects the overall forecast quality, resulting in an optimal 0.5 
setting for the critical value, but the forecast accuracy for failures alone could be dramatically 
improved by lowering the critical value closer to the relatively percentage of failures observed ex 
post. It seems advisable that the critical value should be set prior to forecasting by examining in-
sample prediction accuracy and selecting an ideal critical value that best satisfies the objectives 
of the forecaster with regard to survivor, failure or combined forecasts.   
The model is identified very well in the estimates here because of the use of data from the 
two most severe periods of bank failure in the United States since the early 1930s.  Future work 
will focus on extending the out-of-sample-forecast window. Also a more decisive effort to sort 
out the most useful window of information on independent variables would be beneficial, though 
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results here favor the use of very recent data only.  Generally the one-quarter information set 
dominates the others in both the in-sample fits and in the out-of-sample forecasts.  
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